

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FORTY-FIFTH MEETING
DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 30 May 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mrs. MYRDAL

(Sweden)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELLO-FRANCO
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE
Miss M. GOES

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. N. MINTCHEV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U Tin MAUNG
U Aye LWIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
Mr. A. GUTLIEB
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. E. PEPICH
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. M. HAMID
Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. R.K. RAO
Mr. G.D. COMAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAGIATI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA
Mr. L.C.N. CBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. M. BIEN
Mr. J. SLAWINSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. C. SANDRU
Mr. E. GLASER

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Mr. A.A. ROSECHIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. V.N. ZEREBTISOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.S. HASSAN
Mr. A. EL ERIAN
Mr. M.S. AHMED
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. J.S.M. SEATTOCK
Lord NORWICH

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. V. BAKER
Mr. R. STURGILL

Special Representative of the Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I declare open the forty-fifth meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): After the events of yesterday it seemed to me that it would be preferable if we went back to our work on general and complete disarmament, and I propose this morning to attempt to answer the questions on that subject which were asked at our fortieth meeting on 21 May by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan. We are very grateful indeed that he shared his thinking with us on some of the fundamental problems before the Conference and that he raised searching questions worthy of our continuing attention not only at this meeting but also at later points in the Conference, as our further studies and further developments here in our discussions enable us to deal in greater depth with the problems posed.

The penetrating questions raised by Mr. Barrington of Burma during the same meeting and by Mr. Edberg of Sweden on an earlier occasion will likewise require further consideration at a later date. My statement of today, I am afraid, will in itself be too long; so I hope to reply at a later meeting to the questions put by Mr. Barrington and Mr. Edberg -- indeed, we have already given some preliminary answers to some of Mr. Edberg's questions.

I should like now to give such preliminary replies to the questions raised by the representatives of the United Arab Republic and of Burma. I should also like to touch today upon at least some of the interesting recent interventions of the representatives of Brazil and India. I should like to begin with the important series of questions raised by the representative of the United Arab Republic.

Mr. Hassan's first two questions, if I interpret them correctly, are addressed to the Soviet Union. His third question (ENDC/PV.40, p.23) is, if I may paraphrase and condense it slightly, as follows: Because of numerical differences in each side's inventory of delivery vehicles, might not a level of 70 per cent retained arms at the end of stage I of the United States treaty outline aggravate imbalance by accenting differences near the dangerous minimum safety line or second-strike capability?

(Mr. Dean, United States)

That is a very pertinent question. The United States considers this question of a second-strike capability to be a valid and important one. But, as I am sure all members knew, the United States, because of its traditions, its moral standards and its constitutional system, under which only our Congress can declare war, is not a first-strike nation. I repeat: the United States is not a first-strike nation. We do not believe in a pre-emptive attack, nuclear or otherwise. We do not believe in initiating a nuclear war. I think that the position of the United States Government with respect to the non-transfer of fissionable materials and of nuclear weapons is well known. We have therefore given this first question of Mr. Hassan's very serious consideration. This consideration was, of course part of the thorough and detailed analysis of the present military situation which the United States made in the process of preparing its draft treaty outline (ENDC/3C).

In the course of its study the United States concluded that in the first stage of disarmament, when all militarily significant States will not necessarily be parties to the treaty -- and in using those words the United States thought it was advancing, not retarding, the possibility for general and complete disarmament -- and when the international machinery to settle disputes and to maintain the peace apparently will not be substantially stronger than today, the United States will be willing and prepared to go into disarmament only as far as it can do so safely, without jeopardizing the peace. Thus, in the first stage the United States would not be prepared to go beyond the point which would jeopardize either its second-strike capability -- I emphasize "second-strike capability" -- or the strength of other components of military power required for the fulfilment of its responsibilities.

We brought together in panels some of our ablest military and political science experts, and in the light of their most thorough studies the United States concluded that a 30 per cent across-the-board reduction in armaments would be consonant with these requirements in the first stage and with the concept of a balanced three-stage disarmament process.

Now let me turn for a moment to the second stage. As far as the second stage is concerned, the United States would be prepared to make a 50 per cent reduction in the armaments remaining after stage I, in line with an across-the-board cut affecting both the first-strike capability and the other components of military power of all militarily significant States.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

As far as the military situation of the Soviet Union is concerned, our knowledge is of course incomplete and our estimates are subject to constant reconsideration. Our ability to formulate proposals is hampered to a certain extent by the very factor that Mr. Zorin has brought up here so many times -- the preoccupation of the Soviet Union with secrecy. However, our best present estimate is that while the Soviet Union, if it so wished, could in a nuclear exchange cause the gravest damage to the United States and its population, the Soviet Union does not possess at this time either the first- or the second-strike capability to destroy the United States. If, however, this estimate should prove to be incorrect and the Soviet Union does in fact have nuclear strength equal or superior to our own and missiles pouring out of its factories like sausages, as has sometimes been claimed by Mr. Khrushchev, then the Soviet Union could not claim any inequity in percentage reductions.

In any event, we believe that the approach of across-the-board percentage reductions safeguards the most important principle of balance and is consistent with the idea of disarmament in three balanced and progressive stages, with the amount of disarmament increasing in each stage until one arrives at general and complete disarmament at the end of stage III. Moreover, by reducing in percentages, the two sides approach equality more closely with each percentage reduction in those categories of armaments where there might have been some difference in strength at the beginning. I think that is a very important point.

On the other hand, we regard our proposals for a 30 per cent cut across the board as a norm rather than as an invariable requirement, and we would be willing to examine objectively any data or any case presented as to any inequities that might be involved in particular instances. It is not our purpose in presenting our plan on general and complete disarmament either to create or to maintain inequities. We believe in the principle of balanced and equitable disarmament in the various stages.

The fourth question raised by the representative of the United Arab Republic dealt with the problem of so-called foreign bases. The United States draft treaty outline provides for the reduction and elimination of all bases, whether foreign or domestic, as the disarmament process progresses. As I have already pointed out on a number of occasions, it is quite apparent that as armaments and armed forces are reduced the number of military bases now required by States to provide logistic support for them will also diminish.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

With respect to the first stage, we believe that the United States draft treaty outline meets whatever legitimate concerns the Soviet Union might have in this regard, since even in the first stage the United States plan provides for a 30 per cent reduction in intermediate-range ballistic missiles, which by virtue of their specification, -- the fact that they are in the intermediate range -- are stationed for the most part outside the continental United States; as well as for a reduction in intercontinental ballistic missiles, which may be stationed within the United States. The intermediate-range ballistic missiles are, for the most part, stationed outside the continental United States and the intercontinental ballistic missiles are, for the most part, stationed within the United States.

The United States treaty outline also specifically requires proportional reductions in fixed launching pads and all other categories of armaments which can be located at so-called foreign bases. As members know, these foreign bases exist by treaty or other arrangements worked out with the country where the bases are located.

In connexion with his question on bases, the representative of the United Arab Republic touched upon the possibility, at least, of devising some arrangements for redeployment of forces of the two sides so as to provide for their withdrawal from points of friction. We are happy to note that the representative of the United Arab Republic recognizes the geographic and strategic factors involved in any such arrangement. If one looks at a global map -- preferably not a flat Mercator projection -- one will see that the United States is separated from its allies by at least three vast oceans and by vast air spaces. Therefore, the time and space factors mentioned by the representative of the United Arab Republic are of vital importance in the defence arrangements of the Western Alliance. On the other hand, if one looks at a global map of the Soviet Union and its allies, one will see that they form a very large cluster or land mass of contiguous States, which makes it possible for the Soviet Union to rely on internal means of communication and to redeploy its forces as it sees fit within either a very short period of time or a relatively short period of time.

Members are well aware, I am sure, that it takes a very long time to establish and to staff a foreign base. If these foreign bases are given up, it

(M. Dean, United States)

is not as easy to re-establish them as it is to move around in the same contiguous land mass. Thus, any withdrawal, even a limited one, on the Western side from what might be regarded as points of friction would be of far greater military value to the Soviet Union.

In this connexion, I should like to note that the Soviet Union has been advancing various schemes aimed at the withdrawal of Western forces without ever objectively and realistically evaluating or discussing the factor of equivalence which was so rightly recognized by the representative of the United Arab Republic. The geographical location of the United States and its allies as compared with the geographical location of the Soviet Union and its allies is a matter of tremendous military importance which must not be overlooked in any programme of general and complete disarmament.

With further reference to Mr. Hassan's question, the United States believes that additional complexities of a truly major extent would be introduced into our negotiations if questions of deployment of forces were added to those of levels of armaments as suggestions requiring treaty agreement.

In speaking of the problem of the elimination of the means of delivery, the representative of the United Arab Republic referred to the Soviet proposal for the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage. He then said that he was :

"... familiar with past projects which did not provide for total destruction of all means of delivery from stage I. Instead, those projects had envisaged their gradual abolition." (ENDC/PV.40, p.14)

At our forty-first plenary meeting the representative of the Soviet Union responded to this remark by Mr. Hassan with the following statement :

"Mr. Hassan, the United Arab Republic representative, speaking about the desirability of making efforts to resolve differences, in particular concerning the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, pointed out that past projects of the sides provided for the gradual abolition of these means of delivery. I have to make the following correction : the Soviet Union has not put forward such a proposal. As for the United States proposals, which, incidentally, the United States representative mentioned at one of our meetings, their real meaning was not the gradual elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons but the establishment of control over them."

(ENDC/PV.41, p.45-46)

(Mr. Dean, United States)

I refer my Soviet colleague to the Declaration of the Soviet Government on General and Complete Disarmament, dated 19 September 1959. This plan called in the first stage for:

"The reduction of armaments and military equipment at the disposal of the armed forces of States to the extent necessary to ensure that the remaining quantity of armaments corresponds to the level fixed for the armed forces."

(A/4219, p.14)

This Soviet plan also called for "the destruction of air force equipment" and "missiles" in the third stage, presumably including all those nuclear delivery vehicles which had not been eliminated by the first-stage measure quoted above.

Further, it is interesting to note that this 1959 plan also provided for the elimination of foreign military bases in the second stage and of nuclear weapons in the third stage.

I also wish to point out to my Soviet colleague that the United States plan of 25 September 1961 (ENDC/6) provided for the reduction of an agreed number of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage, for further reductions in nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the second stage, and for the completion of the programme of general and complete disarmament in the third stage, to the point where States would retain only those non-nuclear armaments required for the purpose of maintaining internal order.

The fifth question put by Mr. Hassan was the following: If the proposal for the destruction of all means of delivery in the first stage were to be accepted, would this not leave all foreign bases without nuclear delivery weapons, and, therefore, would not those bases represent less of a threat than they do now?

Again I presume that this question was addressed primarily to the delegation of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, I should like to state, in answer to this fifth question, that this would be the logical result of the Soviet proposal, and that consequently elimination of the so-called foreign bases in the first stage is a superfluous requirement even under the Soviet plan.

The sixth question of the representative of the United Arab Republic relates to the idea underlying the United States proposal for reduction of means of delivery by a specific 30 per cent. In this connexion he wondered whether in view of the West's requirements for inspection of the retained vehicles, or those remaining hidden, any thought had been given to the reduction of delivery vehicles by an agreed number.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

The United States believes that as a general premise the importance of verifying the arms retained increases as cuts in armaments grow deeper.

In this connexion we note that Mr. Hassan's question also seems to recognize this premise -- namely, that the importance of verifying the arms retained increases as cuts in armaments grow deeper -- and that our views coincide with those expressed by the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Atta, at our thirty-first plenary meeting when he said:

"If we destroy a very small percentage of arms, say 5 per cent each year, I am prepared to accept the argument that there will be no point in verifying what remains. As soon as we begin to destroy a significant percentage, however, what remains becomes very important. In my opinion, a 30 to 40 per cent cut is such a significant figure." (ENDC/PV.31, p.9)

The United States has taken this basic factor into account in developing ideas for possible methods of verification which would expand as disarmament progressed and reductions became more significant.

The United States treaty outline contains a suggestion for such verification in the form of progressive zonal inspection. However, while we recognize that the significance of the levels of armaments retained increases as greater cuts are effected, we also believe that in areas such as that of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, where the number of armaments is relatively small, even at the beginning of the process of reduction, and where the destructive capacity is indeed very great, the levels of armaments retained in this category are important from the very beginning. Therefore the United States believes that regardless of whether reductions are effected by agreed numbers or percentages in such sensitive areas, the point is reached very soon where some assurance is needed that the weapons destroyed are not replaced and that no armaments are in fact concealed.

The United States treaty outline provides in the first part of the first year of stage I for a 10 per cent reduction of delivery vehicles before any inspection for the remainder begins. This, we believe, is in effect very close to what Mr. Hassan has suggested; that is, the first reduction would be subject to verification only as far as the armaments to be destroyed were concerned and there would be no verification of remaining armaments until after the reduction had been made. This is a very important observation.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

However, the United States view is that in this extremely vital area of national security a 10 per cent cut is a very significant one, and therefore the United States believes it could not begin reductions at all without a specific commitment that there will be some arrangement, perhaps such as the suggested progressive zonal inspection -- or a better system, if one can be found -- to verify the levels retained by the time the 10 per cent reduction has been effected.

In his seventh question Mr. Hassan enquired how the United States defined the full measure of control considered necessary for ending the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons in the first stage. Our answer is this. The cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes would require two types of verification: first, the verification of the closing or conversion of declared production facilities and the monitoring of declared facilities that continue production for peaceful purposes; and second, inspection such as the progressive zonal plan to give assurance that no clandestine facilities are maintained.

While the United States believes that there should be an appropriate correlation between the degree of disarmament and the degree of inspection with regard to overall territorial inspection for clandestine facilities and agreed levels of armaments to be retained, it also believes that this principle in no way affects the requirement for specific inspection arrangements with respect to agreed reductions of armaments and restrictions on declared production facilities involved in the disarmament programme.

Thus in the case of the cut-off all declared facilities for the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes would be subject to inspection to ensure that the obligations had been implemented. However, the United States was prepared in the past and is still prepared today to devise arrangements which would initially minimize this requirement, perhaps through such techniques as the plant-by-plant shutdown of production facilities proposed by the United States in 1960.

As to inspection to ensure that no clandestine facilities are retained, the United States would be prepared to rely on such methods of verification as the suggested progressive zonal inspection system or any other system which we can

(Mr. Dean, United States)

agree is better. I should like again to make it clear that we have studied the progressive zonal inspection system and believe it has possibilities, but we are in no sense wedded to it if it can be improved upon or if a better system can be devised.

The eighth question of the representative of the United Arab Republic involves the way in which we envisage the application of control to our proposal for a prohibition on the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear Powers, and on assistance to such Powers in manufacturing nuclear weapons. Let me make it clear that the United States believes that this question of non-diffusion can best be treated through an across-the-board effort at nuclear containment and reduction of the nuclear threat. Our treaty outline, in section C of stage I, provides an aggregation of measures which would be helpful in preventing the proliferation of national nuclear capabilities (ENDC/30, pp. 8-10).

Taken in this broader context it seems to us that the various measures of control required would, so to speak, complement each other, to provide what might be termed a system of collateral safeguards. For example, an inspection system based on proposed International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on the transfer between countries of fissionable material for peaceful purposes would provide ways of dealing with this problem. So, too, would experience in implementing an agreement on a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, as well as on the transfer of agreed quantities to non-weapons purposes.

We believe that this problem can be most effectively solved through action aimed not at one isolated issue but at the nuclear complex as a whole, and consequently we have not attempted to work out specific inspection requirements for dealing with non-transfer apart from the other measures with which it is interrelated in our outline. But again we would be most happy to receive suggestions on this point.

I should now like to turn to the ninth question. The representative of the United Arab Republic was also interested in receiving additional information regarding the exact nature and purpose of the committee of scientific experts to study the reduction and elimination of stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the first stage and the obligation of States towards that committee. Mr. Hassan thought such studies might profitably begin now so that the results would be available well before the time of the signature of the treaty.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

The United States delegation agrees with Mr. Hassan that a study of these matters now would be useful. As I have said here as recently as the day before yesterday, treaty provisions on these critical matters must be as detailed and as explicit as possible, and they must be worked out before the treaty is signed. Consequently a thorough technical assessment of the situation will be required before the treaty can be signed. Anything that could be done to expedite this work would meet with our approval.

Now exactly what the scientific experts should be asked to do is something which must be worked out very carefully. By way of illustration, however, let me mention a few of the areas the scientific experts might explore. They might consider the various ways and means for storing nuclear weapons, methods for detection of the presence of nuclear weapons, and the extent to which industrial activity might serve as an index to clandestine weapons production.

Let me add that it would be the intention of the United States to carry out in complete good faith whatever agreement we reach on the basis of the experts' findings, provided, of course, that other parties do the same. Here again the main point is to get as much technical background as we can in order to facilitate the practical processes that must accompany the implementation of disarmament, for disarmament consists not only of theory but of practice. As the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, reminded us on Monday, the important consideration is to work out what is practical, by which is meant the feasible and the effective.

The tenth question asked by Mr. Hassan was how the veto would operate in the council of the international disarmament organization. In my statement last Friday (ENDC/PV.42) I mentioned some of the reasons why we were concerned about the Soviet position. I pointed out that we objected to the Soviet proposal permitting an indirect veto through a troika -- the so-called three-way arrangement -- and a direct veto through reference to the Security Council. Let me make it clear that our objection is not to the basic concept of a veto over transition. What we object to in the Soviet draft is the power that this would give to the Soviet bloc to veto, and indeed frustrate, the implementation of other provisions of the treaty, including the verification and peace-keeping measures.

As members know, the United States is not a member of a bloc, and the United States, as practice has proved and as anyone can see in the records, does not always vote as do its allies; nor does the United States expect its allies

(Mr. Dean, United States)

always to vote with it. But, according to my research, the Soviet bloc almost invariably votes as a unit. Under the Soviet plan, the United States, as a single Government, would not have the same power of veto, or power to frustrate, on these important measures as would the Soviet bloc voting as a whole. This is a very important distinction which must be carefully noted.

With respect to the question whether the United States does not likewise potentially benefit from the veto right on transition from stage to stage in the United States draft plan, our position is clear. We do consider that a mutual veto on transition simply recognizes the hard facts of security requirements in the present world. So far we have been unable to find any way of overlooking these hard facts. Such a condition for transition provides, further, a means of assuring fulfilment of solemn treaty commitments and, in our judgment, this is as important to the Soviet Union as it is to the United States.

The representative of India, Mr. Lall, apparently sympathized with this point of view, although, referring to an informal suggestion he had previously made, he said that there may well be ways of dealing with the transitional stage "without involving the Security Council and the large element of unanimity which the Charter of the United Nations prescribes for decisions of substance in the Security Council". (ENDC/PV.40 p.46) Mr. Lall's idea, which seems to my delegation to be most worthy of study, is that, provided the United States and the Soviet Union can make an agreed recommendation, the control council should take a vote on the question whether we should proceed to the subsequent stage in our general and complete disarmament programme.

In the same connexion, Mr. Hassan very pertinently wondered whether the United States had possibly not changed its views in suggesting that at some point the Security Council could be called upon in regard to determinations relating to the transition process.

In our plan of 25 September 1961, which was laid before the General Assembly of the United Nations by President Kennedy and forms the basis of the draft treaty outline we have submitted here, it was stated: "The IDO" (International Disarmament Organization)" shall ... determine the transition from one stage to the next" (ENDC/6, p. 3). But this language did not preclude an appeal to the Security Council from the international disarmament organization's determination on transition. Our treaty outline provides for a review by the international

(Mr. Dean, United States)

disarmament organization's council of the situation respecting transition. This review would be for the purpose of determining whether all undertakings to be carried out in stage I had in fact been carried out, whether all preparations required for stage II had been made, and whether all militarily significant States had become parties to the treaty (ENDC/30, p.19). If one of the permanent members of the control council of the international disarmament organization decided that these conditions had not been met, then transition might be delayed for as much as but no longer than three months. At the end of this time, if the member remained unsatisfied, it could appeal to the Security Council of the United Nations for a final determination. All of this is nothing more than a more detailed elaboration in treaty form of our plan of 25 September 1961.

In his eleventh question, Mr. Hassan adverted to an important problem when he raised the point regarding the possibility of some change in weapons inventory during stage I of the United States outline, and he asked whether this change would have to be made known in the light of the obvious factors of mutual confidence involved. I dealt with this problem in my statement here on 25 April. At that time, after noting that the production which will be permitted during stage I should be quite small, I said it would be:

"...unrealistic to expect that this production will be spread proportionately over all types of armaments in each category. For this reason it is to be expected that the continued production in stage I, even though it may be small, will change to some degree the proportion of the various types within each category."

(ENDC/PV.27, p.9)

However, we believe that the important point to bear in mind is that there must be a net reduction. In other words, under the United States treaty outline any production which is permitted in a category must be compensated by the destruction of sufficient additional armaments in that category to ensure that the 30 per cent reduction in that category is maintained. Moreover, the criterion of destructive capability has been proposed as a safeguard against substitution of more destructive weapons for these destroyed. So while we proposed the criterion of destructive capability only with respect to two categories, that is, armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 15,000 kilograms or greater and missiles having a range of 300 kilometres or greater, we remain ready, as we have said, to consider the criterion of destructive capability for application to other categories.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Finally, the United States outline provides for verification by the international disarmament organization of the production limitations we have proposed. This means that changes in each party's mix of weapons would be known to all concerned.

The representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington, in his interesting statement on 21 May (ENDC/PV.40) raised another question on which I should like to comment. As I understood him, in seeking for some means to break what he termed "the deadlock on control" he suggested that both the Soviet and United States forms of control might be used in the disarmament treaty. Mr. Barrington's thought was that if the United States were to accept the Soviet form of control for stage I, then in stage II the Soviet Union should accept a form of verification that would give reasonable assurance that agreed levels of remaining armaments were not being exceeded, Mr. Barrington's premise being that during the early stages of disarmament, before a significant cut in armaments had been attained, the same kind of assurances with regard to remaining armaments might not be necessary. This is a very pertinent observation. This would naturally mean that the proposals within each stage would have to conform to the controls envisaged, for, as Mr. Barrington observed, the link between disarmament and control is unbreakable.

As I have already pointed out in my reply to one of Mr. Hassan's questions, the United States believes that small reductions in armaments would involve lesser risks. Therefore, verification of the levels of armaments to be retained might not be essential, at least initially, in such cases. However, we also believe that the first stage of any disarmament programme should involve significant reductions, and the United States draft treaty outline does in fact provide for such significant reductions.

On the other hand, following Mr. Barrington's concept, if we were to accept the Soviet concept of verification for the entire first stage, it would seem to us that that might mean that the reductions in that stage would have to be very limited and this, of course, would not be conducive to the rapid progress in general and complete disarmament which we all desire. In a sense, we have already accepted Mr. Barrington's suggestion in our proposal for the first step 10 per cent reduction of arms in the first year. But, as I have indicated, it is our present estimate, at least, that the risks tend to become so much greater after the first

(Mr. Dean, United States)

10 per cent step has been taken that it would not be wise to continue reducing without verification of retained levels. This is, however, a very interesting suggestion, and we will of course give continued study and consideration to this problem. We thank Mr. Barrington for his suggestion.

At our thirty-ninth meeting the representative of Brazil suggested (ENDC/PV.39, p.20) -- I use the word "suggested" because he explicitly refrained from making a proposal -- that we begin here to study the technical aspects of verification with a view to seeing whether the progressive zonal inspection system, or some other system, might form the basis for negotiation. We welcome this suggestion and we think it useful. I have indicated our willingness to begin technical studies of various aspects of the verification problem before stage I. The United States is prepared to participate in an expert study of the verification problem at an agreed date when the necessary preparations for such a study can be completed. We agree that the provisions concerning verification should be as explicit as possible, and for that reason we believe that a technical assessment of the situation will be urgently required before a treaty is signed.

Let me also refer to the most interesting intervention of the representative of India at our fortieth meeting (ENDC/PV.40, pp.46 et seq.). He agreed with our concept that as arms reductions increase there should be a progressive increase of the coverage of inspection in each country. He then referred to a method other than progressive zonal inspection which might make this possible. My delegation would be very interested to hear more details about this proposal. As I have said several times, we have spent a great deal of time and study on progressive zonal inspection, but we put it forward as an example, and we are sure that there must be other ways of accomplishing the end we all seek, which is to provide assurance to each State that other States are carrying out their obligations, and yet to avoid any threat to the real security of States resulting from the verification arrangements.

Mr. Lall also referred to the provision of the Soviet draft treaty which appears to provide a right of inspection to all atomic energy plants (ibid., p.47). On 28 May I dealt with these provisions, and with the interpretation of them made by our Soviet colleague. It would be a very hopeful sign indeed if they had the meaning Mr. Lall gave them but I believe we must await the detailed answers of the Soviet representative to our questions, before we know whether this is true.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

In conclusion, may I say that my delegation greatly appreciates the questions raised by the various representatives in connexion with the problems before us. In giving our answers -- which I am afraid have been somewhat lengthy and detailed -- we have attempted to be as forthright and concise as possible. We hope that these answers will be helpful. If the representatives who asked the questions wish further clarification, or if they feel that we have not completely answered their questions, we will be only too glad to give any additional information at our disposal. We believe that serious discussions of this type can only further our work here on general and complete disarmament, which is the primary purpose of this Conference; and we believe that such discussions are in keeping with the spirit of earnest negotiation which I am sure all of us wish to see prevail at our Conference, in order that we may expedite our work on a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): The deliberations on the measures in the second stage bring us to the substance of the problem of disarmament, namely, the question of eliminating nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and all kinds of weapons of mass destruction.

The characteristic feature of our time is that any real disarmament programme must be based on the elimination of nuclear weapons. In the work of our Conference that is the criterion, the acid test, as it were, of the realism and value of the two plans -- the Soviet and the American.

The draft treaty proposed by the Soviet Union provides for the implementation of this condition in a consistent manner by the neutralization of nuclear weapons in the first stage and the complete destruction of all stocks of these weapons and the total cessation of their production in the second stage. In the United States plan, this question is dealt with quite differently: the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is very remote and, it must be added, is an uncertain prospect, in no way guaranteed.

The United States, which has recognized the need to introduce into its plan the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons beginning in stage II, persists in its old idea of retaining those weapons with all their accessories until the end of the disarmament process.

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

We have already shown, when discussing the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles, that the main obstacle to agreement is the approach to the question of removing the danger of a nuclear war. The difference between the two concepts of disarmament is shown even more clearly by an examination of the proposals of the parties for eliminating nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union provides, in articles 22 and 23, that after a period of fifteen months from the entry into force of the treaty, that is to say after the implementation of the first stage, States shall proceed to eliminate nuclear weapons, irrespective of kind, type and destructive power from the equipment of their armed forces; to destroy all depots and installations for the storage of nuclear weapons; to convert fissionable materials contained in nuclear weapons to peaceful uses; to stop all production of new nuclear weapons and fissionable materials for military purposes; to convert to peaceful uses the reserves of fissionable materials intended for the manufacture of nuclear weapons; and to destroy all chemical, biological and radiological weapons, together with the installations and equipment for their use. This measure will be accompanied by cessation of the production of weapons of these types. Lastly, States will entirely eliminate or convert to peaceful uses industrial enterprises engaged in the production of weapons of mass destruction.

In his statement of 25 May Mr. Dean, the representative of the United States, described these measures, and the total elimination of delivery vehicles for nuclear vehicles during the first stage, as Draconian proposals. We agree. These would indeed be Draconian measures, but measures against the greatest of evils -- against war and against those forces which aim to unleash it. It is, precisely, thanks to these measures that rather less than three years after the disarmament treaty come into force the world would be freed from nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, and from all means of delivering nuclear weapons, including rockets.

Thus, if the measures provided for in the first two stages of disarmament under the Soviet plan were carried out, the possibility of a nuclear war and of a surprise attack with weapons of mass destruction would be entirely eliminated in scarcely three years. At the same time, the possibility of waging war with conventional weapons would be considerably restricted.

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

In this connexion, I should like to state my opinion on the argument often repeated in statements by representatives of the Western Powers that the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament, in placing the main emphasis on the danger of a nuclear war conducted with the aid of delivery vehicles, underestimates the chances of an outbreak of war with conventional armaments.

The United States representative even referred to the fact that sitting round this table are delegations of countries which suffered heavy losses during the first and second World Wars, which were fought with conventional armaments. It is hardly necessary to say that the Polish people were among those who suffered most terribly as a result of these two wars. But it is precisely for that reason that we are fighting so passionately against any repetition of such a tragedy. It is therefore logical and understandable that we should be fighting above all against the most horrible threat of today: the use of nuclear weapons.

Now, how can it be argued that by depriving the hydra of war of its most dangerous weapon we are weakening the attempts to render it harmless? We are doing exactly the opposite. We know that the strategy of the modern armies of the Powers which are of decisive importance in the world is based on the nuclear weapon. It is precisely this weapon which, if it was used, would plunge mankind into a hell of suffering indescribably more atrocious than that brought about by the two previous wars.

Moreover, it should be emphasized that it is not in order to freeze the level of conventional armaments that the Soviet plan provides for the elimination of nuclear weapons; for a large simultaneous reduction in armed forces and conventional armaments provided for in this plan would also reduce the possibility of waging war with those means.

An examination of the principles of the American plan shows that a reduction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons by 35 per cent in all, and a similar reduction in conventional armaments, would take place during the three years of stage II. On the other hand, nuclear weapons would be reduced to very vague levels which, moreover, would depend on the no less vague conclusions reached by experts after examining the situation.

The United States plan not only provides for the retention of nuclear weapons, but makes it possible to continue manufacturing them. True, it refers to limitations

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

on production. But with constant technical progress being made and scientists continuing their laboratory experiments, might not the reduction in the quantity of nuclear weapons be compensated, even with an advantage, by the production of an improved nuclear weapon?

I should also like to draw attention to another important difference. The American plan advocates reducing the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union to a level of about one million men, that is to say, a reduction similar to that provided for in the Soviet plan. Under the American plan, however, these forces would not be armed in the same way as under the Soviet plan. They would be fully equipped with modern arms and with nuclear weapons and rockets of reduced, but still enormous potential, whereas under the Soviet plan they would only have conventional armaments. That confirms once more the ineffectiveness of the system of proportional reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and of nuclear weapons themselves - the system which Mr. Dean again attempted to defend today.

Even in the sixth year of the execution of the American plan, that is to say at the end of stage II, the danger of a surprise attack with nuclear weapons and the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war would not have been reduced by this system. It can be maintained, on the contrary, that these dangers would have increased, for, parallel with its partial disarmament measures, the American plan provides for a system of control which, being disproportionate to the disarmament measures, would be able to reveal the state and disposition of the troops of the other party. Mr. Dean confirmed this again today, when he said that the control of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles must be complete, even though they are to be reduced by an insignificant proportion.

Is all this in any way comparable with the measures proposed by the Soviet Union?

Nor can we ignore that the large-scale disarmament measures included in the first and second stages of the Soviet plan would have a profound and positive effect on the economic and social development of the world, both in the highly-developed countries and in those in process of development.

In this connexion, it is interesting to recall the conclusions of the Consultative Group on the Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament which found, inter alia, that to provide the developing countries with a per capita increase in national income of between 1 and 3 per cent per year, the highly

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

developed countries would have to increase their financial aid and investment by at least \$15,000 million a year. This amount could easily be provided by the release of the enormous sums now devoted to military purposes.

In view of the great needs of the developing countries, only radical disarmament measures like those provided for in the Soviet draft can quickly bring substantial assistance to the countries faced with difficulties in their economic development -- difficulties which, we must add, were not of their own making.

Disarmament under the American plan does not guarantee that the funds which would ensure an improvement in their situation will be allocated to the economic development of the developing countries. That is not only because the American plan does not provide for the transfer of such funds for those purposes, but also, and mainly, because the measures proposed in the American plan are much more limited in scope and do not include complete elimination of the most expensive weapons.

I should also like to make a few comments on the provisions of the two plans for the maintenance of international peace and security. Under the Soviet plan, the armed forces of States made available to the Security Council under Article 43 of the United Nations Charter would be ready, during the second stage, for possible use under Article 42 of the Charter. The American plan, on the other hand, advocates the establishment of what it calls a United Nations Peace Force, but completely ignores the relevant articles of the Charter. It thus implies that the force could be used for action outside the framework of the Charter -- action in which, need we add, it might employ the nuclear weapons with which the United States wishes to provide it.

Another example of how attempts are being made to infringe the United Nations Charter is the provision in the American plan for the development of rules of international conduct for relations between States, which would come into force as general and complete disarmament was carried out. The whole basis of this American concept, which is not derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of States but entails the introduction into international life of certain new rules drawn up by a new legislative body, must suggest reservations on our part. As can be seen from stage II, section G, paragraph 2 (ENDC/30, p.25), this body could impose on States, in their international relations, rules of conduct established by itself.

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

Similar comments come to mind on examining the United States proposal concerning the establishment of another new body, the United Nations Peace Observation Corps. The United Kingdom representative sought to reassure us by asserting that, since this body would function within the framework of the United Nations, it could not weaken it. This argument is not convincing. The heart of the problem is not whether it is sought to set up new bodies within the United Nations or outside it, but whether this is to be done in conformity with, or contrary to, the letter and spirit of the Charter, which lays down the rules for United Nations activities.

All this leads to the conclusion that the Western delegations foresee the need for an extensive revision of the United Nations Charter, consequent on the drafting of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. I shall pass over the procedural side of the question, in particular the fact that the Eighteen-Nation Committee has no authority to review the Charter, which in any case prescribes suitable procedure.

Some fundamental questions demand our attention, however. What is the purpose of duplicating, or in fact replacing, the United Nations Charter by a new code of conduct in international relations? Why should disarmament reduce the value of the United Nations Charter as an instrument regulating relations between States? Why should the adoption of this new code be a condition for the transition to stage III of disarmament? Would it not create a further obstacle to general and complete disarmament?

The problems we have presented here show that with regard to second stage disarmament measures too, there are essential differences of conception between the American and the Soviet plans. The Soviet draft reflects a consistent desire for general and complete disarmament. In the United States draft, we are struck by the tendency to prolong the process by measures which would take an inordinate length of time, and which basically consist of quantitative limitations on armaments. We are convinced that the course chosen by the Western Powers cannot lead to the objective so ardently desired by the peoples of the world. Sterile and abstract concepts must be rejected in favour of measures which can really lead to the fulfilment of the tasks agreed on in the Principles of September 1961.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): I should like to thank Mr. Dean for his detailed clarifications on the questions, or the thoughts, of my delegation. We had not realized that our questions would require so much time and effort on the part of Mr. Dean. I should therefore like to apologize to him for the trouble we have caused him. While in fact we are very keen to meet the convenience of our two co-Chairmen, nevertheless I am convinced that the explanations and clarifications given by Mr. Dean today will prove to be very useful and fruitful when we come to the real stage of negotiation.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The Committee is now considering in real earnest the proposals for the second stage of general and complete disarmament. The delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States -- the authors of the two documents submitted to the Committee for consideration -- have given certain explanations. We have also listened to the comments and views of the delegations of a number of other countries. This discussion has brought out more clearly than before the decisive criteria which make it possible to judge whether a particular disarmament plan meets vital requirements, and whether it is in accordance with the aim of general and complete disarmament.

The main difference between the present period and previous times in regard to that field, the problems of which are being considered by the Committee, is the existence of nuclear weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery in the hands of States. This fact has made a radical change in the nature of war.

Humanity has experienced two world wars. These were destructive wars, imposed on the peoples by the aggressive forces of German imperialism. The number of casualties in these two wars is calculated in tens of millions. But even this woe and suffering cannot be compared with the consequences of a nuclear war. If the aggressive forces succeed in unleashing such a war, it will entail a real national disaster for a number of States, whose territory will be turned into deserts scorched by atomic blast. Neither the water barrier of the oceans nor mountains will afford any protection against the conflagration of such a war. This is the grievous but inexorable truth. It is the duty of governments, aware of their responsibility towards the peoples, to take realistic, effective measures to avert the threat of a nuclear war and to prevent a nuclear catastrophe. This is how the people understand this matter and this is what they demand from the disarmament negotiations.

(Mr. Zerin, USSR)

For this reason there is something particularly monstrous about the endeavours which we observe in some Western countries, above all in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, to glorify nuclear weapons and to propagate in numerous books and articles the necessity of using nuclear weapons for settling international disputes. Activities of this kind which directly jeopardize the cause of peace and the security of the peoples, make it extremely necessary to take drastic measures against war propaganda in general and nuclear war propaganda in particular. Nuclear barbarism cannot be stopped by verbal appeals and ethics, by sermons about loving one's neighbour. States must assume hard and fast, definite obligations, as proposed by the Soviet delegation in its amendments to the draft declaration on the prohibition of war propaganda.

The peoples of all countries have clearly expressed their attitude to nuclear war and to nuclear weapons of mass destruction. They demand that nuclear weapons, and the threat of a nuclear war, should disappear from the face of the earth forever. This will of theirs cannot be obscured by arguments to the effect that the peoples are not afraid of every kind of war, but of a sudden or accidental war, as the representative of Italy would have us believe. Ordinary people know that the key to the prevention of war is the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. For this reason they assess any proposal from the point of view of whether it guarantees the fulfilment of this most urgent and vital task.

We are now discussing the second stage of disarmament. On this depends how matters will develop -- whether there will be a turning point and the world will become a new one, a world without weapons, or whether matters will go into reverse towards a new upsurge in the arms race. We believe that only the first course is possible, but in order that it should become a reality, we must firmly close all outlets and loopholes for a retrogressive movement and to eradicate that which is now the basis and pivot of the modern war machine -- nuclear weapons.

This is the starting point of the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Government. The destruction of the means of delivery in the first stage of disarmament in accordance with our draft treaty will in practice exclude the possibility of a nuclear war breaking out. I stress the fact that this will be excluded in practice. And the implementation of the

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

second stage, during which nuclear weapons themselves will be destroyed, will complete the solution of this problem and will make it completely impossible for a nuclear war to break out.

Mr. Dean ascribed to us the intention to make our disarmament plan more attractive by our emphasizing that the implementation of the Soviet plan would mean putting an end to the danger of a nuclear war by the end of the first stage. However, it is clear to everyone that if the Soviet proposals are attractive to the peoples, it is not because of their face value, but because they are in accordance with the peoples' innermost desires and express the demands of our times. The Soviet proposals ensure within a period of approximately eighteen months the actual elimination of the danger of a nuclear war, since States would no longer have the means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets. Yes, they ensure that three years after the treaty comes into force, by the end of the second stage of disarmament, the danger of a nuclear war would disappear completely and for ever. States will not have the material resources for waging such a war. This is a fact which is reflected in the Soviet draft treaty, and it cannot be refuted.

At the meeting on 25 May the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, appealed for a realistic approach to the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament taking into account international conditions as they are. He said:

"We have to address ourselves to what we find in the world of today, whether we like it or not. We have got to address ourselves to world conditions as they are. We have got to look with a hard sense of reality at the current world environment ..." (ENDC/PV.42, p.20).

Unfortunately the real attitude of the United States, as it appears from the discussions in the Committee, is in striking contrast with this statement and is very far from taking into account the actual situation which exists in the world. We do not see a sober, practical approach in the United States proposals. They do not solve the main problem of the present time -- the problem of eliminating the danger of a nuclear war; they do not solve this problem either in the first or the second or even in the third stage.

(Mr. Gorin, USSR)

On 28 May Mr. Dean confirmed this when he pointed out, in explaining the United States proposals, that under the United States proposals, and I quote:

"... this would leave some nuclear weapons at the end of stage II, just as it would leave some nuclear delivery vehicles." (ENDC/PV.43, p. 18)

What else is needed to start a nuclear war? Nothing, except an order -- and you call this a realistic plan for general and complete disarmament!

Mr. Dean asserted that the United States outline of basic provisions is the most practical approach to the elimination of the threat of nuclear war. And he sees the practical aspect of this in a gradual reduction of the dangerous proportions of nuclear war. But can we take these arguments seriously if we remember that during the whole process of disarmament under the United States plan, States would retain those elements, the combination of which makes it materially possible to start a nuclear war, namely the nuclear weapons themselves and the means of delivering them to their targets.

Mr. Dean appears to realize that his arguments are unconvincing and that the United States proposals are indefensible. In order to bolster his position in some way he resorted to attacks on the Soviet proposals. I must say that the Western representatives were particularly zealous in using this device after we had already discussed the first stage, when it became clear how inadequate the United States proposals were for the main disarmament tasks. The explanation is apparently quite simple. There are no weighty arguments against the Soviet proposals, no grounds for serious criticism of them, and in place of this they try to substitute a battle of words with shortcomings of the Soviet draft treaty imagined by themselves.

The draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Government has been in the hands of the members of the Committee for some time. They have had time not only to read it but to study it carefully. But Mr. Dean's statement has caused bewilderment. For example, he asserted that the Soviet draft treaty does not contain any proposal for the reduction or elimination of national military bases. Having said this, he began to conjure up a spectre: that perhaps, under the Soviet plan, national bases would be eliminated only in the third stage, but even this was vague and imprecise. Then followed a rhetorical statement:

"We see no reason whatsoever to wait until stage III ..." (ENDC/PV.43, p. _____)

Your fears are needless, Mr. Dean. You have imagined them yourself, you have become their victim, and you want to scare others as well.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Here is what is stated in paragraph 3 of article 2 of the first stage of the Soviet draft treaty:

"All living quarters, depots and special premises previously occupied by units being disbanded, as well as the territories of all proving grounds, firing ranges and drill grounds, shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the civilian authorities." (ENDC/2, p.10)

What does this mean? It means that the points where the military units to be disbanded are stationed, in other words, national bases occupied by these units, will be dismantled. You will say that these are not bases but cantonments and that you want something more technical. Very well then.

Let us look at article 5, paragraph 1 of the first stage of the Soviet draft treaty:

"All launching pads, silos and platforms for the launching of rockets and pilotless aircraft, other than those pads that will be retained for peaceful launchings under the provisions of Article 15 of the present Treaty, shall be completely demolished. All instruments for the equipment, launching and guidance of the above mentioned rockets and pilotless aircraft shall be destroyed. All underground depots for such rockets, pilotless aircraft and auxiliary facilities shall be demolished." (ENDC/2, p.)

Is this not a definite and firm obligation to destroy national rocket bases? Where are there any such obligations, Mr. Dean, in any of the stages of your plan?

Look further at article 6 on the elimination of bomber aircraft, and at article 7 on the elimination of warships and submarines which are vehicles for nuclear weapons, and you will see there precise obligations to eliminate these types of national military bases. In the first and second stages the Soviet treaty provides for the reduction of national military bases, while in the first stage the most important bases will be eliminated -- the bases for the means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

The example concerning national military bases is far from being the only one. I could adduce others. Let us take Mr. Dean's argument on 28 May about the failure of the Soviet plan

"...to stop production of conventional armaments" and "its failure to make detailed provisions for specific reductions of existing conventional weapons stocks ..." (ENDC/PV.43, p.16)

(Mr. Lorin, USSR)

We have already shown by actual quotations from the provisions of the Soviet draft treaty that we propose a considerably larger reduction of conventional armaments than the United States does. We have no desire to raise the question, but the statements made by Western representatives compel us to do so. Why should the Committee be led into the path of futile controversies and away from the obvious? What is the aim of the Western representatives in doing this?

Mr. Dean asserted that the Soviet proposals would not lead to the elimination of the threat of nuclear war in the first stage. His argument ran like this: "You see, the Soviet draft treaty would not touch civilian vehicles capable of delivery of nuclear weapons." He painted a gloomy picture of how nuclear bombs could be discharged through existing doorways and windows of civilian aircraft. He also talked about ships and trucks which could be loaded with delayed-action nuclear bombs and left somewhere in a port or inhabited place. It is true we noted that, although Mr. Dean also spoke about ships and trucks at the meeting, he evidently realized how naive such arguments were, and we no longer find them in the verbatim record of the meeting.

It is hardly necessary to engage in polemics with the United States representative on all these matters. The arguments which we heard from him could be applied in regard to adventurers of the type of the OAS, who are operating in France and Algeria. But we shall not expatiate on the question of to what extent it is out of place to use arguments of this kind in respect of States and governments.

Apparently Mr. Dean would like to cover up the indisputable fact that under the United States disarmament plan there will be no need for civilian aircraft, ships or lorries in order to unleash a nuclear war. It would only be necessary to press a button at the rocket launching pads, send up bombers and give the order to surface vessels and submarines, carriers of nuclear weapons. This danger of a nuclear war starting at any moment is a direct concomitant of the United States disarmament proposals right up to their final stage, that is, for a period of not less than ten years according to the computation of the United States proposals themselves.

It remains for me to add that the United States has taken care to ensure, as the United States representative was good enough to explain to us at one of the meetings, that military rockets will always be ready for action. The United States intends to conduct tests of stockpiled rockets so that they do not become damp and unfit for delivering a nuclear blow. This is a fact, and it is recorded in the

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

verbatim records of the Committee. This is what you ought to speak about, Mr. Dean, and not about imaginary gaps in the Soviet plan regarding the cessation of the production and testing of conventional types of armaments.

Evidently realizing that, on the basis of the substance of the questions, he could prove the advantages of the United States disarmament plan over the Soviet one, Mr. Dean resorted to formal arguments about the Soviet proposals not being in accordance with the Agreed Principles for general and complete disarmament. However, his interpretation of the Agreed Principles was quite arbitrary. He said that the Agreed Principles mention the desirability of completing disarmament in every field but do not indicate in which stage the destruction of particular weapons should be completed. We agree that the Agreed Principles do not mention when particular types of weapons should be destroyed. In fact, no such task was set before the Agreed Principles. They had to define the general scope of general and complete disarmament, but the specific methods and time-limits for implementing the measures were to be worked out in the disarmament agreement. That is precisely the task of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

One may say with much greater justification that the Agreed Principles do not stipulate that disarmament should be extended over an indefinite period and that the compulsory elimination of all types of weapons should be completed on the last day of the implementation of the disarmament programme. No; the Agreed Principles are based on a different concept, namely, speedy and effective implementation of general and complete disarmament.

Mr. Dean has tried to create the impression that we do not understand correctly the purport of gradualness in disarmament. He interpreted the word "stage" as though it corroborated the United States proposal for a percentage reduction. One may well ask what would be the point of having stages if they have essentially one and the same content. At the meeting on 28 May Mr. Dean explained that the theme of stage II of the United States treaty outline was like that of stage I.

(ENDC/PV.43, p.12) However, in that case the real meaning of stages is lost since the whole disarmament programme would then be one single uniform stage. In such a situation the stages would have a completely artificial purpose, namely, simply to divide up the implementation of the disarmament programme and create the conditions for halting or even putting an end to it. Would not this be the outcome of the United States demand for the right of veto over transition from stage to stage, which Mr. Dean has confirmed today?

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

The purport of a stage is the opposite to what Mr. Dean asserted. It is to solve in the course of disarmament the various problems which are determined both by the military and political situation and by the actual content of disarmament. That is precisely what is contemplated in the Soviet draft treaty.

Mr. Dean repeated the arguments which we had heard earlier from the United Kingdom representative that the gradual reduction of military establishments provided for under the United States plan would maintain what he called the "existing pattern", namely, the same or virtually the same situation as exists at the present time. We have already pointed out the danger inherent in such an approach. If we translate Mr. Dean's arguments into simpler language, what they amount to in substance is that the present dangerous situation, where the peoples live in fear of a nuclear war, would be maintained during disarmament.

Mr. Dean tried to justify this by the need to ensure balance in the disarmament process. He spoke about this again this morning. The further our negotiations proceed, the clearer it becomes that the United States sees the whole purpose of balance in the retention of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and in that alone, right to the end of the disarmament process. To the United States a world without nuclear weapons would for some reason be an unstable one.

In his statement on 28 May Mr. Dean asserted that the elimination of nuclear weapons in stage II

"...would alter the relative military strength of the NATO and Warsaw Pact Powers, would cause serious imbalance in the existing military mix ..." (ENDC/PV.43, p.13)

If we say that there would be no longer be any possibility of a nuclear war being waged either by NATO or the Warsaw Pact countries, then it is true that the mix would alter; a nuclear war would become impossible. But that is one of the main purposes of our negotiations. There are, however, no grounds for asserting that the relative military strength of the NATO and Warsaw Pact Powers would alter, since conventional armaments would be equalized.

Mr. Dean maintained that the Soviet Union's proposals for the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in stage I and of the nuclear weapons themselves in stage II would be impracticable from the point of view of increasing confidence between States, but this argument is groundless. When the ever-present threat of an appalling nuclear conflict continually looms over the heads of the peoples, no

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

measures can re-establish confidence sufficiently. On the contrary, the destruction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and the nuclear weapons themselves, as the Soviet Union proposes, would within a short period build a firm basis for the establishment of normal international relations, relations based on confidence and co-operation.

Despite many artificial questions, Mr. Dean's statements have clearly shown that the substance of the differences between the sides in regard to stages I and II consists in the disarmament measures themselves and, above all, the nuclear disarmament measures. We think that the time has come to make the matter quite clear and to ask the United States delegation whether the United States is prepared to accept, without any reservations, the obligation to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons. A straightforward answer must be given to this question. Our answer is: Yes, the Soviet Union is prepared to accept this and insists on it. It is now up to the United States to give its answer.

One further remark. Mr. Dean has asserted that he notes in the Soviet delegations's position a definite trend towards relegating verification to a subordinate and less effective role in the overall programme. The Soviet Union is far from underestimating the role of verification, as the members of the Committee can see from the draft treaty submitted by us and the control measures incorporated in each stage of it. However, if we intend to conduct businesslike negotiations, it is essential to see the clear inter-relationship between disarmament measures and control measures and to put them in a proper perspective. We consider that the discussions in the Committee have shown very clearly that the control measures should be determined by the disarmament measures. In this sense control measures are subordinate and subservient. It is not a question of any trend on the part of the Soviet delegation but of the real state of affairs, the real disarmament process.

I must say that remarks made by Mr. Dean and Sir Michael Wright at recent meetings indicate that we are once again encountering the already familiar attempts to push disarmament measures into the background. In the past, attempts of this kind, the gist of which is to substitute control over armaments for disarmament, have inevitably led the negotiations into an impasse. We do not want a repetition of the past and for this reason we cannot disregard Mr. Dean's statement,

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

since its purpose was to justify the need for control over retained armaments. He stated literally the following:

"This is a real problem for all of us. It is a matter of substance and one to which we must address our most careful attention." (ENDC/PV.42, p.16)

The main difficulties, however, as we now clearly see as a result of our meetings, do not lie in questions of control, but in the disarmament measures themselves. The Soviet delegation would like to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to page of the verbatim record of the meeting on 28 May (ENDC/PV.43). What does it say on this page? It says that, regardless of what system of control and inspection the Soviet Union agrees to, whether it be a zonal or any other system, the United States will not agree to the elimination of nuclear weapons in stage II. We are justified in doubting whether the United States will agree at all to the elimination of nuclear weapons; we are led to this conclusion by the numerous reservations in the United States draft treaty.

In any case it is beyond dispute -- and this was clearly stated by Mr. Dean -- that the United States is not prepared to accept the elimination of nuclear weapons in the second stage, regardless of any control. It is therefore not a question of control. This is the crux of the matter, and all the arguments of Mr. Dean and of his United Kingdom colleague about the inadequacy of the Soviet proposals in this respect are only a manoeuvre and an attempt to divert attention from the main point -- from the unwillingness of the United States to settle indeed the problem of nuclear disarmament in the first place.

We must say frankly that it was strange to see how the United Kingdom representative, Sir Michael Wright, expended so much effort on the question of detecting weapons "under the jacket". How can such statements help us in our work if the Western Powers are not prepared to accept complete elimination of nuclear weapons not only in the first, but in the second or even in the following stage? The very problem of weapons "under the jacket" sounds artificial coming from the lips of the representatives of those States who insist on retaining nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery throughout the entire process of disarmament, and give no firm assurances that they will not be retained in the future. Why look for weapons "under the jacket" if the weapons remain, so to speak, openly, on a legal basis? The Western representatives do not like the word espionage, but

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there cannot be anything else when with the existence of huge permitted stocks of weapons under the United States plan, people roam about the territory of States in search of weapons "under the jacket".

Wishing to impress upon us the complexity of control, Sir Michael Wright put forward as an example the discovery in the Soviet Union of a powder magazine dating from the time of Peter the Great. He obviously wanted to instil the idea that it took almost two centuries to find a concealed stockpile. We do not dispute the fact that this find was interesting; but for whom? for the science of history or for disarmament? We know that in the United Kingdom archaeological excavations are also carried out and weapons from even more ancient times are found -- from the days of Julius Caesar. Should we therefore regard this also as proof of the difficulty of control? Apparently the desire of the Western Powers to rummage in other people's affairs is so great that they are prepared to turn control over armaments into archaeological excavations.

In a number of statements the Soviet delegation has made it clear that we provide for full control over those arms which are destroyed in accordance with the agreement. Our draft treaty ensures appropriate control also over the reduction of armaments. This control is such as to give all parties to the treaty the assurance that the disarmament obligations are being complied with. Moreover, as we move forward, as States pass on to further measures of disarmament, the scope of control will be extended. The Soviet delegation has already had an opportunity of showing how wide will be the control established in the second stage of disarmament. Practically the whole war industry, with the exception of the extremely limited part engaged in the production of the least dangerous types of armaments, will be under control. Only an insignificant part of the military potential of States will remain outside control.

In his statement on 25 May, Mr. Dean touched again on the question of transition from one stage to the next. He dealt with this question again today. In our previous statement, when we analysed the Soviet and United States proposals for transition from the second to the third stage, we showed that the United States proposals actually provide unlimited opportunities for any permanent member of the control council and the Security Council to interrupt the process of disarmament. In its draft, the United States provides States with an opportunity to avail themselves of a wide range of pretexts, not even related to disarmament itself, in

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order to put an end to disarmament and to frustrate the implementation of the treaty. The United States has not even attempted to refute our arguments because they are so self-evident. Instead, Mr. Dean set about interpreting the Soviet proposals in his own way, and ascribed to the Soviet Union the desire to have at least two vetos in regard to transition from one stage to the next. He repeated this once again today.

The Soviet Delegation deems it necessary to say, with a full sense of responsibility, that we do not provide for any veto on transition from one stage to the next. We have already quoted passages from the memorandum of the Soviet Government explaining our approach to the question of how decisions should be taken in the international disarmament organization. These passages showed that there is no question of any kind of veto in the transition from one stage to the next in the Soviet draft treaty.

However, Mr. Dean built up his assertions regarding the desire of the Soviet Union to obtain the right of veto, on various computations concerning the composition of the international disarmament organization. It is not to his liking that we consider it essential, in settling the question of the composition of the international disarmament organization, to take into account the existing situation in the world -- that is to say the existence of three main groups of States. Mr. Dean said that the United States is reluctant to accept such a division of the world into three groups. However, Mr. Dean, it is not a question of what we would like. We would also like to see a different world but not, of course, the one you would like to see. However, we approach the question as reasonable people and take into account what actually exists. The existence of three groups of States does not depend either on your wish and will or on our own; it is brought about by the objective course of history. And if you point out the need to take into account the real situation in the world, let us indeed take into account this real situation and draw the appropriate conclusions also in constructing the international disarmament organization.

Mr. Dean does not like article 40 in the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union. But what does this article stand for? It stands for the same need to take into account the real international situation. We have created the United Nations and invested the Security Council of this organization with the main responsibility for maintaining peace throughout the world. The Soviet Union starts

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from the promise that in implementing general and complete disarmament our efforts must be directed towards strengthening the United Nations and its capacity to maintain and consolidate international peace and security. Indeed, if, after the beginning of general and complete disarmament, any State should undertake action directed against international peace and security, what could we do and what steps should we take? Quite naturally, we would have to appeal to the Security Council as the Charter of the United Nations obliges us to do. This question is certainly not linked with the question of control or of transition from one stage to the next, as Mr. Dean artificially asserted.

The Soviet Union makes a clear distinction between questions of peace and security, which come within the province of the Security Council, and questions coming within the scope of the implementation of disarmament measures and of control over them, which appertain to the functions of the international disarmament organization. These are two separate questions.

It follows from Mr. Dean's statements that the United States does not like the clear distinction of functions as between the international disarmament organization and the Security Council, which is drawn by the Soviet Union. This dislike was revealed even more clearly, as is often the case, in the statement of the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, at the meeting on 24 May. He said:

"I personally should like the disarmament organization to enjoy wider powers than those provided, particularly, in the Soviet plan.

According to this plan, the disarmament organization would simply take note of facts and would have no further powers." (ENDC/PV.41, p.31)

This statement by Mr. Cavalletti is very noteworthy. It shows that the Western Powers would like to invest the international disarmament organization not only with the functions of control but also military and political functions. However, this line of theirs is nothing but a line aimed at undermining the United Nations and weakening the Security Council as the main organ for maintaining general peace and security. Such a line does not correspond either to the interests of peace or to the interests of disarmament.

Mr. Cavalletti's remark indicates the real reason for the Western Powers' dislike of article 40 of the Soviet draft treaty. The point, of course, is not that this article allegedly makes it possible for the Soviet Union to impose a veto on any particular control measure. The artificiality and lack of foundation

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of these assertions are quite obvious. The point is that this article is aimed at supporting and further strengthening the United Nations and its main organ -- the Security Council. Its role in maintaining international peace and security is obviously not to the liking of the Western Powers who would like to usurp the rights of the United Nations and to create an international disarmament organization in the form of some kind of world policeman, having at his disposal large armed forces -- Mr. Dean even admitted the possibility of these forces being equipped with nuclear weapons -- for the purpose of interfering in the internal affairs of States and for subjugating peoples.

The United Kingdom representative, Sir Michael Wright, tried to dispute our conclusion that the proposals of the Western Powers are aimed at undermining the United Nations. The representative of Poland spoke about this today and gave, it seems to us, a correct answer on this subject. Sir Michael Wright built up his arguments on the fact that the international disarmament organization and the armed forces for maintaining peace will be organs of the United Nations. But the whole question is, on the basis of what provisions will they operate? And the fact that the creation of armed forces of the United Nations in the United States plan is not based on Article 43 of the Charter of the United Nations shows that the Western Powers have in mind to subordinate these armed forces not to the Security Council but to some other organ, perhaps the international disarmament organization. Experience shows that the label does not always correspond with the contents, particularly in such questions as international armed forces. Unfortunately, we have already had bitter experience in this regard in the Congo.

The United Nations, as determined by its principles and as is laid down in the Charter, is an organization of States and not a supra-national organization. It is a forum for co-ordinating the efforts of States in the task of maintaining peace and developing businesslike peaceful co-operation. The development of these functions of the United Nations is the right way to strengthen the United Nations and to implement the provisions of its Charter.

But in what direction are the Western Powers driving?

"It would be to give confidence that if any nation had arms hidden 'under the jacket' or were tempted to disregard its obligations,

United Nations action would be swift and effective." (ENDC/PV.43, p.10)

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That is what Sir Michael Wright said. What swift and effective action of the United Nations forces do you have in mind, Sir Michael Wright? To start a war, to occupy States with the forces for the maintenance of peace, and, moreover, to start a war for any reason, under any pretext? Sir Michael Wright puts forward as a reason for "swift and effective" action by the forces for the maintenance of peace the supposition that a State had failed to comply with its obligations. From studying the United States proposal we know that in it, apart from the undertakings directly concerning disarmament and control, there are also included definite political obligations -- for instance, to adopt "rules of international conduct". It would appear that refusal to accept such rules, according to Sir Michael Wright, is an adequate reason for military repression.

Where is the implementation of the basic task for which the United Nations was created -- the task of arranging and developing co-operation between States and the peaceful settlement of disputes? It is absent. Instead, we are to have imposed upon us the creation of a world policeman, who according to the simile of Sir Michael Wright, will search citizens and their homes, that is States. It is not an international disarmament organization, subordinate to the United Nations and acting in accordance with the United Nations Charter which you are proposing, Sir Michael Wright, but a police system over States. Of course, no one can agree to this.

We object to this most strongly, and precisely for this reason in the Soviet draft treaty all actions for maintaining peace and security, including the formation and utilization of international armed forces, are distinctly and clearly entrusted to the Security Council in complete conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. This is our interpretation of articles 40 and 42 of our draft. But we shall revert to a more detailed analysis of these articles when we have finished considering the questions of the second and third stages of disarmament.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I had not intended to weary my colleagues today with a speech, but the last speech to which we have listened provokes me to say just one or two words; I hope not to detain my colleagues long.

The speech to which we have just listened was really rather extraordinary. It was a somewhat muddled, I think, and diffuse attack upon the whole Western approach to our negotiations. Naturally I shall want to study what has been said,

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and probably to come back to it at a later stage. My chief regret about the speech, though, was that it was wholly unconstructive. Indeed, it did not seem to further our discussions at all. It ranged over a tremendously wide field. Our Soviet colleague was rather free with his criticism of his Western colleagues. At an early stage in his speech he said, "We do not see a sober approach in the proposals of the United States." He went on, just after that, to say that nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon vehicles would still remain at the end of stage II. And then somewhat dramatically he said, "And yet you call this general and complete disarmament." That was what I took down, and I hope I have it right. What an extraordinary thing to say! Nobody on the Western side has pretended that at the end of stage II we shall have reached general and complete disarmament. This was an attempt to vilify and distort the Western position, and I see no purpose in it at all -- no purpose whatever.

Our Soviet colleague knows just as well as any of us what the Western position is. Our Soviet colleague knows that, under the United States plan, we in the West are seeking a steady approach to this matter -- a realistic approach, I would say to him -- and that at the end of stage III we shall have general and complete disarmament. I would rather progress with a plan which I think is capable of being carried out and which will in the end reach general and complete disarmament than with a plan which is so unrealistic that it has little chance of ever being implemented at all.

After this attack Mr. Zorin went on to say -- and again I hope I got his words right -- "The Western representatives with particular zeal had recourse to methods of attacking Soviet proposals when it became clear that the Western proposals were inadequate." Well, if we have had recourse to attacking the Soviet proposals, I think we have received our fair share in return, and what we heard this morning is a pretty good example of it. The truth is that the attacking has been very much on the other side. But he said that we had done this with particular zeal when it became clear that the Western proposals were inadequate. I would submit to my colleagues around the table that one thing that has become abundantly clear is that the Western proposals are realistic, very realistic, not inadequate at all, and that they do mount up to something which we can all conceive of as being capable of implementation. If one applies the same objective consideration to the Soviet proposals in their present form, one would find it very difficult to say

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that that could be done. I have said on many occasions that of course I would be willing to hear and consider reasons why certain things should be changed; yet to damn the whole Western proposals in this way seems to me to be quite absurd.

A little later on in his speech our Soviet colleague said --- and again I hope I have got his words right --- that under the Soviet plan the elimination of nuclear weapons in stage II will complete the task of making nuclear war impossible. He went on to say that the Soviet proposals would ensure that within the period of eighteen months that nuclear war could not take place. A little later he said: "Nuclear war will then be impossible. This is a fact recorded in our Soviet draft treaty and it cannot be denied." Well, I, for one, deny it straight away, and I deny it for the simple reason that unless our Soviet colleague can convince us of the effectiveness of verification measures to accompany his proposals, neither he nor anyone else around this table can show that those nuclear weapons or their vehicles will in fact have been destroyed. I have said many times that these two things must go together, and simply writing it into the terms of a treaty document does not bring about, as by a magical wave of the wand, the elimination of these armaments. It has to be carried out, and it has to be shown to have been carried out.

So I say to Mr. Zorin that these extravagant phrases of his, these imaginative phrases, do not carry us very much farther along the road towards disarmament. However pleasant to the ear may be the sound of some of these Soviet proposals, what matters is what happens when they come to be carried out on the ground. I say to him that it is all very well to put forward proposals of this kind, but they must be shown to be realistic and they must be shown to be such as can be carried out to the satisfaction of all sides, so that we may know, in the words used by my colleague Sir Michael Wright the other day, none of them are hidden "under the jacket". Mr. Zorin has not made out his case in this respect, and extravagant phrases are not a substitute for sound concrete suggestions to overcome some of the difficulties.

He referred us to some of the articles in his draft treaty. He referred to the precise words of articles 5, 6 and 7. He also referred to paragraph 3 of article 11. This is all very laudatory, but again he has not yet faced up -- and heaven knows we have asked him enough times to do so -- to how this can be effectively verified in such a manner as to provide satisfaction. I have reminded him many times that, as he knows, this verification issue is one of the big problems confronting us, but I am still waiting to hear any concrete proposals from him on

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how to overcome them. It is not sufficient merely to vilify what others round this table have put forward, particularly when, as in the case of the zonal proposal, proposals have been put forward in a genuine attempt to try and understand the Soviet preoccupation with espionage. It is not sufficient to vilify these proposals; our Soviet colleague still has the duty to come forward with his own proposals to solve these particular difficulties.

Mr. Zorin went on to refer to the suggestion made by our United States colleague, and I think I made it too on a previous occasion -- namely, that in relation to stage I if one tried altogether to eliminate nuclear weapon vehicles and left the nuclear armaments intact, a country which wished to take advantage of the fact that others were disarmed of nuclear weapons would have the possibility of delivering a nuclear weapon by clandestine methods. He said, as I understood him: "Under the United States plan there would be no need to use ships or trucks to deliver these nuclear weapons. One would only need to push a button." It is perfectly true: at the second stage that is all one would have to do; but one would know under the United States plan that if one pushed a button there was someone at the other end who could push a button too.

The point that we of the West have made is that these things must be balanced, and it is the country that seeks clandestinely to retain certain armaments after they should have been eliminated which can create the great damage. Admittedly, under the United States plan, in the first stage and in the second stage and until towards the end of the third stage, this is still possible; it is possible today; this is what we have come here to try to eliminate. But my fear is that under the Soviet plan it would be possible for all time, because I do not believe those proposals are capable of being carried out with the requisite degree of confidence necessary for all States. That is my real fear.

Our Soviet colleague told us a little later in his speech that he is in favour of realistic general and complete disarmament, implemented as speedily as possible -- and I emphasize the word "realistic". I must tell him that I do not think the proposals he has put to us so far are sufficiently realistic. I will not take it further than that. I merely ask him to look at the matter from the point of view of satisfying the rest of us around the table that his proposals are indeed realistic.

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Then he went on to a very odd argument, I thought, when he began talking about the stages. He said there is no logic in using stages if the stages are to be similar; stages would then only divide the process in such a way as to prevent the progress from stage to stage. He told us the Soviet concept of stages is that they should solve different problems in different stages. That I found very strange indeed. It certainly is not borne out by the Agreed Principles, which talk quite clearly of an agreed sequence by stages with each measure and stage carried out within specified time-limits. The fifth Agreed Principle, which has been quoted so many times, refers to the balance. There is nothing inherently wrong in stages which divide up clearly and categorically a uniform reduction stage by stage. I would have thought this was the obvious way to approach it. It is for those who wish to do it by a series of staggered stages, with sudden starts and sudden stops in different stages, to justify why that type of stage is better than an ordered stage of graduated reduction. It is for our Soviet colleague to justify that. I submit to him that he has not as yet justified it.

So I would say I do not see anything wrong in stages or steps being uniform. When I walk up or down steps I like them to be uniform, I find it very jarring to find steps which are not. It is the same in the disarmament process, I think.

Then Mr. Zorin said that under the United States plan during the disarmament process the present dangerous situation would be preserved, and that in the United States view a world without nuclear weapons would be an unstable world. I do not think that is the United States view at all. The United States view, and certainly my view, in relation to this is that a world without nuclear weapons, when we are all assured that others have also got rid of their nuclear weapons, would be a very agreeable world, as would a world without conventional weapons. But during the process we have got to be assured -- on both sides; this is not a one-sided argument -- that this process is continuing fairly and properly. Therefore I do not think that this sort of statement by our Soviet colleague is helpful at all.

The question of the complete elimination in stage II of the nuclear vehicles, which he touched on in that context, is one aspect of this. For, again, there is this difficulty of verification which cannot be ignored, however much our Soviet colleagues would like it to be. He went on to say -- and I was glad to hear him say this -- that the Soviet Union does not underestimate the importance of control. But he went on to talk about the inter-relationship, as I understood it, between

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disarmament and control. He followed this by saying that control measures are subordinate to disarmament. I would agree with him to this extent, that control measures obviously do not take precedence over disarmament; control measures become necessary only when disarmament is beginning to take effect. That is certainly true; they are to that extent subordinate. But they are very closely and indissolubly linked with disarmament, because if you have not got an adequate measure to give that confidence which so many representatives have talked about, then your disarmament will not proceed. The control measure is linked with disarmament, and it must be related to the amount of disarmament; there must be an amount of control sufficient to give confidence for that amount of disarmament to proceed.

I have only one or two very short comments still to make. Mr. Zorin said in relation to the United States, and the West as a whole, as I gather, "We are entitled to doubt whether they will accept the elimination of nuclear weapons at all". A little later he said "The problem of concealment sounds artificial on the lips of Western representatives". I thought these were very damaging statements to make, indeed. I would say that there is not a shadow of justification for them, and they do little good to our Conference. We in the West are very anxious indeed to eliminate these weapons. We are also anxious to know that others have eliminated theirs at the same time. That, I think, is what really divides us on this. There is no question of being artificial. We have to be assured; we are willing to throw away our arms in the West as long as we know that others throw away theirs too. I do not think that is a very unreasonable attitude to adopt, but I do think it is extremely unreasonable for any representative round this table to impugn the motives of others and to doubt their sincerity in this regard.

I would suggest that the Western plan and the proposals that have been put forward with it carry with them their own conviction of realism and sincerity. I am prepared to be judged in relation to that by our colleagues round this table. I do not like it when some of our colleagues, because they can find no adequate answers to the arguments that have been put forward, seek to impugn our motives.

There are several other points that I might have touched on, but time is getting on and I apologize for having taken so much time. I think it would have been very wrong to allow a statement with so many incorrect remarks in it to go completely unchallenged at this stage. I hope that our Soviet colleague will come

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to the next meeting in a better frame of mind and more willing to talk seriously with us about the different parts of our various plans. What I want to do is to make progress in regard to them. It is very important that we should evaluate clearly the differences between the plans and understand just what those differences amount to. It does not help if we merely start imputing wrong motives to those who are in the negotiations with us. I hope that we can continue with our evaluation and that we can then get down, in due course, to the serious task of trying to reduce those differences and not to exacerbate them.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I only wish to say a few words and I shall not detain the Committee for long.

The representative of the Soviet Union has told us many interesting things on which, I believe, we are not in agreement, but which must be carefully considered -- and we shall do so with pleasure. In particular, however, he made certain comments on the Italian Delegation's statements at the meeting on 24 May, and on these I should like to say a few words.

I think Mr. Zorin asserted that I was opposed to proper application of the United Nations Charter and in favour of weakening the United Nations. I do not know whether those were his exact words, for I was not able to take notes. His words will probably appear differently in the record, and in that case I hope the Soviet representative will excuse me. May I be allowed to tell Mr. Zorin that that was not my intention? What I said about the United Nations was as follows:

"We envisage a strengthening of the United Nations, whose Charter did not foresee a completely disarmed world". (ENDC/PV.41, page 32)

That was why I went on to express the opinion that it was necessary for the disarmament process to be carried out easily, quickly and regularly. That was also why I considered the possibility of vesting certain powers in the disarmament organization rather than appealing at once to the Security Council, which would not, in fact, contribute to international harmony, since any appeal suggests a threat to the peace.

It was for this reason that I said:

"One of the parties may fail to carry out certain disarmament measures through mere negligence and without any ill will. In such a case it would be a serious mistake to suspend the application of the treaty

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or to refer the matter to the Security Council, when a recommendation by the Disarmament Organization to the State concerned might suffice to rectify the situation." (ENDC/PV. 41, p.32)

I think the aim of these remarks is certainly not a weakening of the United Nations but, on the contrary, a more harmonious and effective execution of the disarmament process.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its forty-fifth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mrs. A. Myrdal, representative of Sweden.

"The representatives of the United States, Poland, the United Arab Republic, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Italy made statements.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 31 May 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

